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Trans-Eurasian Container Traffic:  
a Belt and Road Success Story  
  
 Countries in Northern and Central Eurasia, including its largest economies, Russia and 
Kazakhstan, were among early believers in the value of the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the 
last years, they increasingly embraced various aspects of the BRI, most importantly 
additional investment and rising volumes of trans-Eurasian traffic. The latter, apart from 
being a lucrative business on its own, should eventually lead to better internal connectivity 
between inner-Eurasian regions. In this article I provide data and estimates for the 
spectacular growth of the volumes of trans-Eurasian container transit. Then I move to explain 
the underlying reasons and prospects. Finally, there are important remarks on the issue of 
financing, the role of China, and the role of international financial institutions.   
  
In the early 2010s, the growing economic and political weight of China led to the 
development of a qualitatively new foreign economic policy strategy. In 2013, President Xi 
Jinping proposed a modern equivalent of the ancient Silk Roads which later has acquired the 
name Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In policy terms, China effectively came up with an all-
compassing foreign economic policy which was designed to economically, financially, and 
politically attractive for other countries. China made a critical and sustainable political 
commitment to the Initiative. Moreover, it provided a heavy financial impetus. This material 
involvement went a long way in persuading more than a hundred countries around the world 
that China was serious about its business.  
Countries in Northern and Central Eurasia, including its largest economies, Russia and 
Kazakhstan, were among early believers in the value of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is 
probably not a coincidence that the capital of Kazakhstan became the venue for the first 
official announcement about the initiative by President Xi Jinping. Later on, in 2016, the 
Chinese and Russian leaders signed a decree on cooperation to tie the development of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with the BRI.  Over the last years, these countries 
increasingly embraced various aspects of the BRI, most importantly additional investment and 
rising volumes of trans-Eurasian transit. In this article, I will focus on one ‘story’ which I 
judge as an evident BRI success – although not without reservation as it usually is in real life.  
Trans-Eurasian land-based container traffic 
Trans-Eurasian land-based transit is primarily a ‘container story’.  Container transport 
remains virtually the only method of delivery of trans-Eurasian land-based transit cargoes. 
The use of containers guarantees preservation of cargo, standard dimensions, reduced 
packaging costs, accelerated cargo handling, unified shipping documents and facilitated 
forwarding.   
There has been a stellar increase in railway container traffic from the EU to China from 1,300 
TEU (20-foot equivalent unit) in 2010. At the end of 2018, the volume of China-to-Europe 
and Europe-to-China transit container traffic crossing the EAEU reached 340,000 TEU. 
Within this period, the traffic grew at 30 to 100% yearly. 
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Virtually all this cargo travels along two routes. The first one is the Central Eurasian Corridor 
(China–Kazakhstan–Russia–Europe, through the territory of Kazakhstan and then on to the 
transport infrastructure of Russia, then to Belarus, then to Poland). In Kazakhstan, there are 
two points of entry from China, namely Dostyk (principal point of entry) and Khorgos 
(volumes are small but rising). The overall length of the route is 7000–7500 km, depending on 
the specific path. It has a number of advantages over other routes:  
(1) an ability to use a single transport modality (e.g., only railway transport);  
(2) a minimal number of customs clearing points (only two: China–Kazakhstan and 
Russia/Belarus–EU);  
(3) ‘traditional’ use and relative importance of the corridor, as it is already used to carry cargo 
in both directions; and 
(4) competitive shipping prices compared with the other Europe–China routes traversing 
EAEU countries.  
The second corridor is the Northern Eurasia one, running from the Chinese North-East 
directly to Russia, or indirectly through Mongolia, then traversing the totality of Russia along 
the Transsib, entering Belarus and then Poland. This corridor is longer but also commercially 
attractive since it originates in Chinese North-East, traverses of number of development 
industrial centers in Russia, and benefits from preferential rates.  
Figure 1. Major Trans-Eurasian Corridors 
 
Source: Vinokurov et al. (2018) 
Chinese transport subsidies, provided since 2013, were crucial to jumpstart the process. Our 
analysis shows that the annual average doubling of the number of container trains along PRC–
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) –EU routes in 2013-2017 was largely attributable to 
subsidization of export-oriented railway freight traffic by Chinese authorities.  We estimate an 
average subsidy of $2,500 per FEU (40-foot equivalent unit). Another estimate of ours is that 
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the average subsidy per FEU was merely 0.4-0.5% of the total value of container-shipped 
cargoes, which is an efficient and thoroughly justifiable cost of export promotion.   
Based on that, we expect to see approximately 500,000 TEU transported along the northern 
and central Trans-Eurasian routes in 2020. After that, the growth would probably slow 
considerably, as the premium value trade nomenclature would be close to exhaustion.  
The need for national and regional institutional capacity to manage BRI-related policy 
coordination, economic development, and investments 
However, if all countries involved would manage lowering the throughput tariff by $1,500 per 
a 40-feet container (from $5,500-6,000 to $4,000-4,500), traffic has the potential to grow up 
to 1-1.3 million TEU. It would demand a higher degree of international economic cooperation 
that it is the case now. Besides, it demands investments into (mostly auxiliary) transport 
infrastructure.  
In fact, no mega-projects are required to expand the transport capacity of land corridors along 
the PRC-EAEU-EU routes and boost their competitiveness vis-à-vis maritime routes. What 
one needs is not a “second Trans-Siberian Railway” but the selective elimination of transport 
infrastructure bottlenecks: construction of additional railways, electrification of new railway 
sections, upgraded and modernized locomotives, acquisition of special rolling stock, 
improvement of border crossing infrastructure, etc. The potential construction of a long East-
West high-speed rail in Russia would become one notable exception to this hypothesis. 
Aiming primarily at passenger transportation, this capital-intensive project would 
theoretically free the existing infrastructure for freight. However, the economic efficiency of 
this project still deserves further assessment. 
The efficiency of trans-Eurasian transit also gains a lot from effective international 
cooperation both in terms of physical infrastructure development (railways, border crossings 
points, marshalling capacities, rolling stock, etc.) and standardization of technical regulations, 
which will enable to reduce delivery times and costs incurred by carriers. It is not enough for 
only one country to provide a boost – be it China with its significant subsidies, Russia 
modernizing its infrastructure (even though Russia accounts for 50 or more percent of the 
total length of the route), or Poland, located squarely on the way to the main industrial regions 
of Europe. The maximum potential of railway container traffic could only be reached when 
the freight rate is about ‘deep sea + $1,000.’ Currently all the railway routes used to connect 
China with the EU countries pass through the EAEU countries. There is no uniform through 
freight rate along their entire length. Each railway company charges its own freight rates 
while changes in these freight rates are not synchronised. Thus, no single railway operator can 
dramatically affect the aggregate amount of the freight rate by changing its freight rates 
without going beyond its profitability range. Thus, ‘deep sea +$1000’ is attainable only if all 
the counterparties invest in this project and coordinate their efforts. 
The realisation of the trans-Eurasian transport corridors’ fullest potential requires the 
concerted efforts of the countries in Western, Northern, and Central Eurasia – naturally, in 
addition to China as the principal BRI driver. There are several interrelated tasks. First, to 
increase land-based container traffic. Secondly, to remove bottlenecks in their transport and 
logistical infrastructure and thereby give impetus to the development of land-locked Eurasian 
regions—the Russian Urals and Siberia, Central Asia and the western provinces of China. 
Third, to create new export opportunities for these regions and ensure their participation in the 
global economy.   
Hence, there is a need for a set of arrangements of functional nature at various levels and 
between various actors. E.g., more work needs to be done to standardise normative documents 
and technical regulations used in Eurasian countries (rules for shipping various types of 
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cargoes, rolling stock operating parameters, environmental standards, etc.). To ensure 
regulatory convergence (CIM/SMGS consignment notes, flawless functioning of border 
crossings, etc.), international working groups representing the ministries of transport, the 
national railways, and the leading industry players should suffice.  
Development Financing 
China does a formidable job of financing the BRI-related infrastructure in countries around 
the world. An interesting feature of the trans-Eurasian container transit is, however, that so far 
countries along the route (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) upgrade their railway using their 
own financial resources. This is likely to change in the future, as Chinese financing is 
generally welcome, in particular for the capital-intensive construction of the high-speed 
railways. Besides, national and multilateral development banks should enter the game. Their 
cooperation among themselves and within the Belt and Road Initiative is vitally important. In 
includes such international financial institutions as the World Bank, ADB, AIIB, NDB, IsDB, 
EFSD and EDB but also, extremely importantly, such national institutions as the Chinese Silk 
Road Fund. They can provide long-term financing for the capital-intensive parts of the BRI 
story.  International financial institutions provide project financing based on signed and 
ratified international treaties that do not depend on local legislation changes, which helps to 
mitigate certain risks. In the IFI-related context, we should also stress importance of the 
availability of subsidized lending as well as grants for technical feasibility studies. They are 
necessary in many occasions, in particular in Central Asia. Even if the results of such 
technical feasibility studies would be negative, it would still be money well spent.  
Developing Together an Efficient Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure  
To sum up, in terms of policy, the key area of common interest for Russia, Central Asia 
countries and the BRI is the development of efficient cross-border infrastructure in Greater 
Eurasia. That means, in particular, modern railway and automobile road transport corridors (I 
did not touch automobile roads in this article since it handled the current state of container 
transit where automobile roads did not yet find their place; it might change in the long-term 
future with the development of driverless lorries). If the physical connectivity of Central Asia, 
Northern Eurasia and China received further boost, it would greatly contribute to unlocking 
the potential of inland regions: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia for China; the 
Urals and Siberia for Russia; and all five Central Asian countries. The optimal policy 
objective is to achieve a substantially higher degree of internal connectivity between the 
inner-Eurasian regions (primarily, but not exclusively, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian 
Urals and Siberia. 
In the first half of the 2010s, the People’s Republic of China provided a necessary political 
and financial (investment, subsidies) impetus to the Belt and Road Initiative. In the second 
half of the 2010s, the countries of Northern and Central Eurasia supported it rather 
enthusiastically, as they realized that the BRI corresponded to their national interests. A 
distinct success story – the spectacular growth of the land-based container transit from China 
to Europe through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus – has materialized. The next several years 
should bring further material results to all involved countries which promise to be substantial.  
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